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LEGISLATIVE NOTE

Illinois' Drug Induced Homicide Statute:
A Tough State Just Got Tougher
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the 1980's draw to a close, it seems apparent the "War on
Drugs" has been lost. Not only are drugs-heroin and cocaine-more

plentiful today than ever,' purity is up2 and cocaine prices are down.'

While the federal government may be losing the war, states are joining
the battle by enacting laws that link drug dealers to drug deaths.

States have been quietly creating a new form of homicide aimed at

drug dealers whose illegal sales cause the deaths of users.
The Illinois General Assembly, in 1988, created a new form of
homicide reserved for drug dealers who sell drugs which later cause
deaths.4 The statute specifies that anyone who commits a specific
1. Based on an increase in drug-related deaths and emergency room visits.
Reported deaths from cocaine increased from 666 in 1984 to 1,253 in 1986, while
cocaine-related hospital emergency room visits increased from 7,054 in 1984 to 26,186
in 1987 (excluding New York), NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS
COMMITTEE, 1987 REPORT 27 (April 1988) [hereinafter NNICC Report 19871. Reported
heroin deaths increased from 1,114 in 1984 to 1,699 in 1986, while hospital emergency
room visits increased from 8,723 in 1984 to 11,390 in 1987 (excluding New York).
Id. at 55. Also, cocaine client admissions reported from 15 states increased from
16,020 in 1979 to 32,321 in 1984. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
COCAINE CLIENT ADMISSIONS 47 (1987). Use of other dangerous drugs is on the rise
including methamphetamine ("crank"), PCP, MDMA, LSD and fentanyl. See U.S.
Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Drug Trafficking - A Report
to the President of the United States 13-15 (August 3, 1989) (available through the
Office of the Attorney General, Washington, D.C.).
2. Purity of heroin purchased on the street in 1985 averaged 5.3 percent, the
highest since 1977, and 6.1 percent pure in 1986. NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE
CONSUMERS COMMITTEE 1985-1986 REPORT 68-69 (June, 1987) [hereinafter NNICC
Report 1985-1986]. Retail cocaine purity increased from 35 percent pure in 1984 to
more than 50 percent pure in 1987. NNICC Report 1987 at 26.
3. Id. In 1984, a wholesale kilo cost $40,000 to $50,000; in 1985, $30,000 to
$50,000; in 1986, $22,000 to $45,000; and in 1987, $12,000 to $40,000.
4. Titled "Drug Induced Homicide." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3
(Supp. 1989). House Bill 4125 passed by the Illinois General Assembly June 28, 1988,
and signed into law by Governor Thompson on August 30, 1988. The statute went
into effect on Jan. 1, 1989.
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felony drug offense5 "by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance
to another, and any person dies as a result ' 6 of the intake of the
drugs commits drug induced homicide. The bill passed also revokes a
drug possessor's driver's license when he is convicted of a second
drug offense and the first drug offense involved a vehicle. 7
The Illinois legislation is not unique. Eleven states have passed
similar drug induced homicide statutes.' Three of those states have
made the offense a capital one, punishable by the death penalty or
life imprisonment. 9 Other states, most notably California, in the
absence of legislation, impose homicide liability on drug dealers
through the felony-murder doctrine, 10 "depraved-heart murder" approach,"1 or by involuntary manslaughter.1 2
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401(a) or (b) (1988).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (West Supp. 1989).
7. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2196-2197 (West), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95
1/2, para. 6-205(b)(5).
8. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)2 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b(6) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(l)(a)3 and §
782.04(4)(k) (West Supp. 1989); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30.1A(3) and (4) (West Supp.
1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) and § 609.20(4) (West Supp. 1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.010 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West Supp. 1988);
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-23-6 (Michie Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. 39-2-211 (b) (Michie
Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West Supp. 1989); Wisc. STAT.
ANN. 940.02(a) (West Supp. 1988).
9. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-13-1105.A.2. (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b.(6) (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04.(1)(a)3 (West Supp.
1988).
10. States that have imposed felony murder in this context in the absence of
specific legislation are: California, in People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d
763 (1958); Virginia, in Commonwealth v. Heacock, 323 S.E.2d 90 (Va. 1984);
Nevada and Minnesota in cases involving more than a mere sale: Sheriff, Clark
County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983); State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160
(Minn. 1977). See infra note 41 and accompanying text. For an argument that this
approach is unconstitutional see Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: The FelonyMurder Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986).
11. "Depraved-heart murder" is a killing done without intent to kill but with
such a reckless disregard for life that the killing is considered first degree murder
and treated accordingly. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 617 (2d ed. 1986).
Only New York, in People v. Johnson, 68 Misc. 2d 937, 329 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Schenectady County Ct. 1972), and Tennessee, in State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943
(Tenn. 1984), have upheld indictments under this approach. See infra text accompanying notes 20-31.
12. Many jurisdictions have cases allowing a manslaughter theory in the drug
furnishing context: Napier v. State, 377 So.2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); People
v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1974); Silver v. Georgia, 13 Ga.
App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913); People v. Cruciani, Misc. 2d 528, 334 N.Y.S.2d 515
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The Illinois statute appears to mimic the felony-murder doctrine

in its manner of operation. No mental state requirement is specifically

stated in the new statute. The statute merely requires that a person

commit the underlying drug delivery offense 3 "and any person dies
as a result of the injection, inhalation or ingestion of any amount of
that controlled substance."

14

Of the other state drug induced homicide

statutes, ten also operate in a manner identical to the rule, but are
technically written to be outside the felony-murder rule. The Illinois
statute, however, appears poorly drafted in comparison to the other

statutes, and creates problems that many of the other statutes avoid.
II.

COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG SELLER'S SUPPLIER'S
LIABILITY FOR THE DEATHS OF USERS
states 5 have cases charging drug suppliers 16

with homicide
Sixteen
for drug-related deaths. Interestingly, six of the twelve states which
have passed specific legislation did so after their courts dealt with the
issue.' 7 The case law in the United States ranges from the imposition
(Co. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 44 App. Div. 2d 684, 353 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 219 Ky. 406, 293 S.W. 975 (1927); State v. Thomas, 288
A.2d 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); People v. Meyer, 46 Mich. App. 357, 208
N.W.2d 230 (1973); State v. Warwick, 555 P.2d 1368 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401(a) or (b) (1988).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (West Supp. 1989).
15. Napier v. State, 357 So.2d 1001 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977), rev'd, 357 So. 2d
1011 (Ala. 1978), remanded, 377 So. 2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Dixon,
109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d (Ariz. 1973); People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d
763 (Cal. 1958); State v. Clayton, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Silver
v. Georgia, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913); Commonwealth v. Brown, 219 Ky.
406, 293 S.W. 975 (1927); State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124 (Kan. 1974); State v.
Thomas, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1972); People v. Johnson, 68 Misc.
2d 937, 329 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (Co. Ct. 1972); People v. Meyer, 46 Mich. App. 357, 208
N.W.2d 230 (1973); State v. Forman, 260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977); Sheriff, Clark
County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d

714 (Penn. 1973); State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Heacock, 323 S.E.2d 90 (Va. 1984); State v. Warwick, 555 P.2d 1386 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976).
16. For the purposes of this article, the term "supplier" will be used to describe
the person who provides or furnishes drugs for the "user." The term "user" in this
article will describe the person who takes drugs.
17. State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d 263 (Ariz. 1973), ARIz. REV. STAT.
§ 13-13-1105.A.2. (West Supp. 1987); State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn.
1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) (West Supp. 1988); State v. Thomas, 288
A.2d 32 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1972), N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West Supp.
1988); Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.010 (1986); State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984), TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-211(b) (1988); State v. Warwick, 555 P.2d 1386 (Wash. Ct. App.

1976);

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 69.50.415 (West Supp. 1988).
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of first degree murder, first or second degree felony-murder, to
involuntary manslaughter.
In the drug-furnishing context, murder charges arise in two ways:
1) depraved-heart murder, based on extremely negligent behavior that
kills; and 2) through the felony-murder doctrine, where a death occurs
during the commission of an underlying felony. The felony-murder
doctrine imposes first or second degree murder where an unintentional
killing occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony. While

murder"8 typically requires a specific intent to kill, neither of these
approaches require such intent.' 9 Depraved-heart murder is based on

reckless conduct which creates a high and unjustifiable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to others, but without any intent to kill or

cause serious injury. 20 A classic example of depraved-heart murder is
shooting into a house or crowd. In the few jurisdictions to have
considered the depraved-heart murder in this context, there is a split
as to whether this approach should be allowed. 2'
A.

DEPRAVED-HEART MURDER IN THE DRUG CONTEXT

In the absence of specific legislation, only Tennessee and New
York courts have found that the sale of drugs is reckless enough to
support a depraved-heart murder prosecution. 22 To allow such an
approach, a court must find the sale of drugs so dangerous and likely
to cause death that recklessness can be inferred from that act. Other
states have rejected the approach, holding the likelihood of death

18. Murder, a common law crime and the most serious grade of homicide, was
originally defined as an unlawful killing of a human being "with malice aforethought." Malice aforethought required an intent to kill that was thought out in
advance of the killing. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1 at 605 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT]. Later, murder was defined to include situations
where there was no premeditated intent to kill: where the defendant killed in a state
of passion or provocation but the provocation was unreasonable or the defendant
should have cooled off in the time between the provocation and the murderous act;
where the defendant unintentionally kills while committing a felony; where the
defendant unintentionally kills while acting in an extremely negligent way, often
described as "evincing a depraved heart;" and where the defendant intends serious
bodily harm but not death. Id. at 606.
19. Id.

20.

LA FAVE & SCOTT,

supra note 18, at 617.

21. See text accompanying notes 22-34.

22. Tennessee in State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984); New York
in People v. Johnson, 68 Misc. 2d 937, 329 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Schenectady County Ct.
1972).
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from a sale or injection of narcotics 23is not great enough to support a
depraved-heart murder prosecution.

In a New York case, People v. Johnson,2 4 a county court upheld

a depraved-heart murder indictment where the defendant supplied
heroin to two teenage girls, one who later died from a self-injected
overdose. 25 Noting it is common knowledge that "frequent deaths
' 26
occur to young persons from the injection of heroin," the court

held, "[t]o be dangerous his conduct must' 2 involve a reasonable
probability of serious bodily harm or death."

In State v. Randolph,2s the Tennessee Supreme Court also found

recklessness in the act of selling through a middleman an unusually

potent dose of heroin which caused a user's death. The court sustained
charges of second degree depraved-heart murder and involuntary

manslaughter also based on recklessness but rejected the felony23. See, e.g., People v. Pinckney, 65 Misc. 2d 265, 317 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Rockland
County Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 217, 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972),
aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 749, 297 N.E.2d 523, 344 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1973) (a New York
supreme court of the appellate division dismissed indictments charging second degree
manslaughter and, alternatively, criminally negligent homicide). The court stated that
the laws of New York do not make the act of selling a dangerous drug and injecting
it with instruments furnished by the defendant a homicide when it causes the death
of a user. Pinckney, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The court in Pinckney said that "[a]lthough
it is a matter of common knowledge that the use of heroin can result in death, it is
also a known fact that an injection of heroin into the body does not generally cause
death." Id. at 552. The court thus held that the defendant did not deviate from the
standard of care of a reasonable person because the proportion of deaths from the
sale of narcotics is not great enough. The court was also concerned with the fact that
the legislature had not explicitly authorized homicide charges in the drug context.
For an analysis of the danger of heroin injections, see infra note 125.
24. 68 Misc. 2d 937, 329 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Schenectady County Ct. 1972).
25. People v. Johnson, 68 Misc. 2d 937, 938, 329 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (Schenectady County Ct. 1972).
26. Id. at 939, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
27. Id. at 939, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The court said it was prepared to distinguish
the Pinckney decision on the basis that selling drugs to teenagers is more dangerous
than selling drugs to adults. The apparent conflict in New York law with the
conflicting cases of Johnson and Pinckney can be resolved somewhat by examining
the most recent New York case decided on this point, People v. Cruciani, 44 A.D.2d
684, 353 N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), where the homicide liability in the
form of second degree manslaughter was allowed. Here also, the court distinguished
Pinckney, this time finding that the defendant knew when he injected the victim that
she was under the influence of barbiturates. Based on Johnson and Cruciani, it
appears that New York courts are not applying the Pinckney decision to limit
homicide liability in the drug furnishing context.
28. 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984).
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murder approach.2 9 The court stated a jury could find the defendant
"acted with such a conscious indifference to the consequences of [his]
highly unlawful activities as to evince malice." 30
Alabama and Pennsylvania explicitly rejected the approach, find-

ing the sale of drugs not dangerous enough to support depraved-heart
murder. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to allow the approach

absent evidence that the defendant intended to kill or injure the
deceased. The Alabama court in Napier v. State' held the act of
giving the deceased a very pure dose of heroin, while reckless, did
not exhibit the degree of malice necessary for a first degree murder
conviction.3 2 Malice in Alabama law, according to the court, requires
that the defendant intend to kill or harm the deceased. 33
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly rejected the depravedheart murder approach in Commonwealth v. Bowden,3 4 finding the
act of injecting heroin into a fellow user not likely enough to cause

death to infer the malice needed for a depraved-heart murder case. 35
"Initially, although we recognize heroin is truly a dangerous drug,

we also recognize that the injection of heroin into the body does not

generally cause death." '3 6 Under those circumstances, the court held
Bowden could not reasonably anticipate his act would cause death. 7
29. State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tenn. 1984). Although the court
did not call this depraved-heart murder it implicitly applied that standard.
30. Id. at 947.
31. 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978), aff'don rehearing, 377 So.2d 1135 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1979) (affirming the conviction of manslaughter).
32. Napier v. State, 357 So. 2d 1011, 1014 (Ala. 1978), aff'd on rehearing,
377 So.2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). The defendant, a drug dealer, purchased a
quantity of very pure heroin, diluted it for sale on the street, then invited friends to
test the heroin. One man, Owings, injected himself with two shots and died. The
heroin later tested at 36.5 percent pure. Normally, street heroin is 2 to 6 percent
pure. The appellate court upheld the first degree murder conviction based on a
depraved-heart theory, which the court called "universal malice." Id. at 1010. The
court noted that while heroin injections do not generally cause death, Napier had
knowledge of the potency of this heroin. Id. at 1009.
33. Id. at 1014. "Without such evidence, a conviction of murder in the first
degree cannot be affirmed." Id.
34. 456 Pa. 278, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1973).
35. Bowden purchased and shared a bag of heroin with a fellow heroin user.
At the user's request, Bowden injected him with a dose consistent with the user's
prior habit, but which in fact caused the user to die of an overdose. Commonwealth
v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1973).
36. Id. at 284, 309 A.2d at 718. This holding is almost identical to the language
in Pinckney, and the Bowden court does cite Pinckney for that holding. See supra
note 23.
37. Id. at 285, 309 A.2d at 718. The court noted that testimony from the
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Thus, in the absence of legislation, courts have been reluctant to
impose depraved-heart murder in this situation. The courts, with the
exception of Johnson and Randolph, hold that the act of selling or
supplying the user with drugs is not reckless enough to support
murder, the highest grade of homicide. 8 Underlying this reluctance
may be the unstated opinion that murder is too severe a form of
punishment to impose on drug suppliers in the absence of an intent
to kill. This would explain why the same courts which reject depravedheart murder in this context often find that the act of supplying a
drug is reckless enough to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter 9
B.

FELONY-MURDER IN THE DRUG CONTEXT

California is the leading jurisdiction to use the felony-murder
40
doctrine in the drug-supplying context in the absence of legislation.
Although this approach has been more successful than the depraved-

Philadelphia medical examiner indicated that the amount injected would not normally
cause death to an addict. The Court also stated that Bowden used heroin with the
deceased often and knew his tolerance. A year later the court reversed and discharged
a second degree depraved-heart murder conviction in Commonwealth v. Parker, 458
Pa. 381, 327 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1974) where the defendant inserted a needle into his
companion and the user pushed the plunger. As in Bowden, the court held that
defendant's act was not one from which the court could infer that the defendant
must have known death was likely to result. Parker at 387, 327 A.2d at 131. The
court found support for this conclusion in the medical examiner's testimony that
"[clertain individuals may take a given amount of drugs for days and weeks and
have no reaction. They may take the same amount on a given day at a given time
and the reaction to that administration is death, or serious illness." Parker at 385,
327 A.2d at 130.
38. It should be noted that in both Johnson, 68 Misc.2d 937, 329 N.Y.S.2d
265 (Schenectady County Ct. 1972), and Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984),
the courts were not imposing depraved-heart murder convictions but merely allowing
such prosecutions. In both cases appeals were not based on convictions but were
from the charges being filed. No case has been found where a court allowed a
depraved-heart conviction in this context.
39. In Napier, for example, the defendant was later convicted of first degree
manslaughter, which requires a finding of wantonness, and the appellate court upheld
the conviction. Napier v. State, 377 So. 2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), writ denied,
377 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. 1979).
40. The California Supreme Court affirmed the approach in 1958 in People v.
Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958) and most in recently People v.
Patterson, No. S006538 (Cal. Supreme Court, Sept. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, CA-CS,
1989 WL 102333 (Cal.)). See infra note 50.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

heart approach, jurisdictions are evenly split between those which
allow the approach and those rejecting it. 41
The felony-murder doctrine is an exception to the general requirement of concurrence in mental state and harm. 42 At common law, the
felony-murder doctrine required only that a death result during the
commission of a felony. With the modern law creation of felonies
which are not dangerous, four limitations have been added, three of
which affect application of this doctrine in the drug induced homicide
context.4 3 Most states limit the application of the felony-murder
doctrine to underlying felonies which are foreseeably dangerous to
life," which means death must be a foreseeable consequence of the
felony.4 5 Illinois limits the felony-murder rule to forcible felonies,
which are by nature dangerous to life. 6 The "foreseeably dangerous"
limitation to the felony murder doctrine is expressed two ways: 1)
that death was a foreseeable consequence based on the particular facts
of the felony including the manner in which it was committed; 47 or 2)
that the felony is inherently dangerous in the abstract. 4 The dangerous
in the abstract limitation has been used to bar the felony-murder
doctrine in some drug cases by courts holding that death is not
foreseeable from the sale or injection of drugs. 49 Thus, for a court to

41. States which impose felony-murder in the absence of legislation are: California, in People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958); Virginia, in
Commonwealth v. Heacock, 323 S.E.2d 90 (Va. 1984). Nevada and Minnesota do so
in cases involving more than a mere sale including injection or administration:
Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983); State v. Forsman, 260
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977). States with cases rejecting felony-murder in this context
are: Arizona in State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d 263 (Ariz. 1973); Kansas in
State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124 (Kan. 1974); Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 309 A.2d 714 (Penn. 1973) and Tennessee in State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d
943 (Tenn. 1984).
42. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 282 n.29.
43. Id. at 622. 1. Limiting the rule to certain felonies; 2. Strict interpretation
of proximate cause; and 3. Narrowing the time period during which the felony is
being committed.
44. See Annotation, What Feloniesare Inherently or ForeseeablyDangerous to
Human Life for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50 A.L.R. 3d 397 (1982).
45. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 626-27.
46. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(3) (1988).
47. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 624. Thus, an armed presence will
make even a non-dangerous felony "foreseeably dangerous to life."
48. Id. at 624. Examples include arson and rape.
49. See State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (use of
cocaine even when injected does not generally cause death). See also State v.
Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tenn. 1984) (courts that refuse to fashion felony-
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allow felony-murder in the drug context, the court must find that
death is a foreseeable consequence of a drug sale or that such an act
is inherently dangerous to life.
California courts have consistently held the felony of supplying
drugs is inherently dangerous in the abstract.5 0 California's homicide

statute limits first degree felony-murder to six underlying felonies."

The statute provides that "all other kinds of murder are of the second
degree."5' 2 Using the drug felony as the underlying offense, California
courts have consistently held drug furnishers liable for second degree
felony-murder for the deaths of users. 3
The earliest case is People v. Poindexter,5 4 where the California

Supreme Court upheld a second degree felony-murder conviction

based on the underlying felony of furnishing narcotics to a minor. 5

The court held that "[taking a shot of heroin was an act dangerous
to human life. Death resulting from the commission of a felony such
as furnishing, selling or administering of narcotics to a minor consti'5 6
tutes murder of the second degree."

murder rule in this context (drug furnishing in the absence of specific legislation)
have noted death is neither inevitable nor is the most probable result of an injection
of a controlled substance).
50. The California Supreme Court recently reconsidered that state's second
degree felony-murder rule over the question of whether drug felonies are inherently
dangerous in the abstract and held that an act is inherently dangerous to life if there
is "a high probability that it will result in death." People v. Patterson, No. S006538
(Cal. Supreme Court, Sept. 7, 1989) (WESTLAW, CA-CS, 1989 WL 102333 at 16
(Cal.)).
51. Arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem or child sexual abuse, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West 1988).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
53. Where the defendant injected the decedent with heroin, the courts upheld
convictions of second degree felony murder. See People v. Granados, 49 Cal. 2d 490,
319 P.2d 346 (Cal. 1957) and Ureta v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. App.
1962). The courts have stated that such an approach is consistent with common law
second degree murder, and that definition was adopted by the legislature when it
created second degree murder. See People v. Taylor, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Cal.
App. 1980). The court rejected the argument that the second degree felony-murder
approach had no statutory authorization. Accord People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d
142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958) and People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr.
459 (1969). See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 648.

54. 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958).
55. People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958). There was

evidence Poindexter not only sold the heroin, but also helped the deceased prepare
the injection and watched the door to the public bathroom while the deceased injected
himself.
56. Id. at 146, 330 P.2d at 767. But see People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812,
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But, in People v. Williams, 7 the high court limited the seconddegree felony-murder rule to felonies which are inherently dangerous
and rejected the offense of conspiracy to obtain drugs as not inherently
dangerous. 8 The reason for requiring the underlying felony to be
inherently dangerous was articulated in People v. Cline59 as necessary
to provide deterrence for the act of furnishing drugs. The test is
whether the offense is inherently dangerous in the abstract, looking
0
at the statutory definition of the offense, not the facts of the case.
California courts have held that the defendant's act in taking the drug
of his own volition does not break the supplier's causation for the
resulting death. 6' Additionally, California courts have held the death
need not be caused by a drug overdose but can be the result of the
defendant's driving under the influence of narcotics. 62 Even in the
absence of specific drug induced homicide legislation, the act of
merely furnishing drugs is sufficient to support a second-degree felony63
murder conviction.

111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1973) (where the underlying offense was a misdemeanor,
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, only unlawful act manslaughter was
supportable). People v. Mayfield, 225 Cal. App. 2d 263, 37 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1964)
(absent an underlying offense, only a group of users that included the defendant and
the deceased who bought drugs together, felony-murder was rejected).
57. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
58. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
In Williams, the defendants were attempting to obtain money or methedrine from a
drug dealer on a street corner. An argument escalated into a knife fight with the
defendants claiming that the drug dealer pulled out a knife and they used their knives
in self-defense. Id. at 453, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 8, 406 P.2d at 649. The prosecution used
conspiracy to obtain methedrine as the underlying felony to support the felonymurder doctrine. Id. at 454, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 9, 406 P.2d at 650.
59. 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969).
60. People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 331, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 462 (1969).
If the act was not inherently dangerous, the actor would not anticipate harm or death
and would not be deterred. Id., 75 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
61. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 829-830, 678 P.2d 894, 897, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 319, 322 (1984). Accord Ureta v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 672, 676,
18 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 (1980).
62. People v. Calzada, 13 Cal. App. 3d 603, 91 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1971) (the
act of driving under the influence of narcotics was held to support felony-murder
where the defendant's ingestion of heroin caused him to drive in the wrong lane and
cause a fatal head-on collision). Id. at 606, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 914. The court also held
that the underlying felony was independent of the felony-murder charge since the
driving offense was complete as soon as the defendant began driving. Id. at 607, 91
Cal. Rptr. at 914.
63. People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1970). The
appeals court summed up the law this way: "It thus appears to be the law, at present,
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Only Virginia follows the California approach, allowing the

felony of furnishing drugs to support felony-murder even in the
absence of a specific drug induced homicide statute. 64 In Commonwealth v. Heacock,65 Virginia followed the California approach by
holding that the distribution of cocaine is foreseeably dangerous,
where the defendant supplied for free a cocaine party. 66 The Virginia

Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that only dangerous felonies could support a felony-murder conviction. 67 Yet, even

accepting that contention, the court held, "as a matter of law, that
the unlawful distribution of cocaine is conduct potentially dangerous
that the mere furnishing of heroin is a felony inherently dangerous to human life
which will, Ireland aside, support a felony-murder conviction." Id. at 59, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 698. But see People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr.
188 (1969) (creating a category of underlying felonies which become "included" or
merge under the felony murder doctrine and therefore cannot support felony-murder).
64. Minnesota followed the California approach only in cases involving more
than a mere sale of drugs. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Forsman, 260
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977), allowed distributing heroin to support felony-murder
where the defendant injected the deceased with heroin after selling it to him. The
court emphasized that Minnesota's third degree felony-murder statute requires the
underlying felony to be "upon or affecting the person whose death was caused by
another." Id. at 164 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (1963)). Citing that language, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that at common law the underlying felony
must be inherently dangerous and held that injecting heroin into the body is a felony
"upon or affecting" the person whose death was caused. Id. at 164. "We do note
that the 'inherently dangerous' limitation developed to alleviate the harsh consequences of the felony-murder rule as lesser and lesser crimes, particularly property
offenses, were made felonies." Id. The court noted that had this case involved
distribution without the "tactile quality" present in Forsman it would present a
different issue. Id. at 164 n.7. In that exact case, State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518
(Minn. App.), cert denied (1985) where the defendant only delivered drugs to the
deceased, the court of appeals rejected the felony-murder approach. The court found
the underlying felony not to be dangerous enough to support felony-murder. Id. at
522. Also, the court found causation to be lacking because the felony was complete
once money and drugs were exchanged. Id. at 523. Nevada courts, prior to the
passage of a drug induced homicide statute, required the drug dealer's presence or
participation in the injection of the lethal drugs. See infra text accompanying note
80.
65. 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
66. Commonwealth v. Heacock, 228 Va. 397, 406, 323 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1984).
Unlike California's murder statute which is silent on felonies supporting second
degree murder, Virginia's felony-murder statute defines second degree felony-murder
as an accidental killing while committing a felony not enumerated in the first degree
felony-murder statute. Id. at 403, 323 S.E.2d at 93, citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33
(1984).
67. Commonwealth v. Heacock, 228 Va. 397, 403-04, 323 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1984).
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to human life." '68 Florida also followed the felony-murder approach
in Martin v. State,69 allowing the sale of heroin through a middleman

to support second degree murder, 70 but Florida's felony-murder statute
has included drug offenses since 1973.71

The states rejecting the California approach72 do so for three

reasons: 73 1) the courts refuse to find a drug sale foreseeably or
inherently dangerous to life; 2) the courts express their unwillingness
to create an extension of the felony-murder rule and explicitly defer
to the state legislature for action;7 4 and 3) the courts find causation

68. Id at 404, 323 S.E.2d at 94. The court also held that where death results
from an ingestion of a controlled substance, classified as dangerous to human life,
the homicide is second degree murder if the substance had been distributed to the
victim in violation of the felony statutes of the state. Id. at 95, 323 S.E.2d at 95.
69. 377 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1979).
70. In Martin v. State, 377 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1979). The court rejected the
defendant's argument that there was a lack of causation because the drugs were
delivered through a middleman. "The heroin distributor, even where the heroin passes
through the hands of another ... and even where the perpetrator is not present
when the death occurs, is the principal in the crime. He is the perpetrator of the
underlying felony and is liable for first-degree murder." Id. at 708 (emphasis in
original).
71. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1973). The most unusual case imposing felony
murder in the drug context is State v. Clayton, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973), where the defendant's stipulation that he ingested a hallucinogenic drug allowed
a felony charge of "possession" of drugs. That charge supported felony-murder
where he inexplicably stabbed a passerby to death. Id. at 861.
72. Those jurisdictions with cases rejecting that approach are: Kansas, Arizona
and Tennessee. Nevada rejects felony-murder in this context unless the defendant's
conduct falls into a narrow category. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
Minnesota rejects the California approach in cases of a simple delivery. See State v.
Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
73. Most courts which have declined to fashion felony-murder rules in
cases such as this, and those which have found no criminal offense to have
been committed, have noted that death is neither inevitable nor necessarily
the most probable result of the injection of a controlled substance. Further,
in cases such as the present, there often is no continuing activity by the
seller and no actual participation in the injection. Other courts have found
a lack of 'causation,' as that term is used in criminal law, between the
unlawful sale of a narcotic and the subsequent death or injury of the user
from overdose, in the absence of some showing that the seller participated
in the injection ....
State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tenn. 1984).
74. In Arizona, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, Tennessee, and Washington,
the legislatures passed drug induced homicide statutes shortly after courts rejected
murder or felony-murder in the drug furnishing context and suggested that legislatures
act to impose homicide in this context. See supra note 17.
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lacking. 75 Where a court discusses dangerousness or likelihood of

death from drug sales or injections and concludes such death is
unforeseeable, the court is using the modern felony-murder limitations

to bar the approach. 76 Where the court rejects felony-murder because
the court finds the death did not occur in the "commission" of a
felony and holds that the felony is complete once the sale or trans-

action is complete, the court is often finding that causation is lacking.77
The Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Sheriff, Clark County
7
is a good example of both limitations at work. Like the
v. Morris,'
California court, the court required the drug offense be inherently
dangerous in the abstract, without reference to the specific victim,
and explicitly rejected the argument that selling drugs is inherently
dangerous per se. 79 The court also required the drug dealer's presence
at the time the drugs were ingested to fulfill the causation require-

ment. 0 That requirement was found in the Kansas Supreme Court
1 There, the court found causation lacking
case of State v. Mauldin."
in the case of a simple delivery, holding that the felony was complete
before the death occurred.8 2 Because the Kansas felony-murder statute
requires a killing during the "commission" of the felony, 3 the court
held that the felony was complete once the buyer and seller parted
company and therefore before the fatal injection occurred.8 4 The court
also expressed its unwillingness to hold that the violation of a statute

75. Three jurisdictions, Kansas, in State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124 (Kan. 1974),
Minnesota, in State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. App. 1985), and Nevada,
in Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983), found causation
lacking when money and drugs changed hands, though Kansas and Nevada courts
suggested that the defendant's presence or help in administering the drugs could
extend the transaction period.
76. See Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124; Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa.
1973).
77. See supra note 75.
78. 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983).
79. Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 859 (Nev. 1983).
80. Id. at 859.
81. 529 P.2d 124 (Kan. 1974).
82. State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124, 126 (Kan. 1974). The defendant, a drug
dealer, sold heroin to a customer who subsequently died from a self-injected heroin
overdose.
83. Id. at 125, (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981)).
84: Id. at 127. The court also distinguished this case from Cruciani, 44 A.D.2d
684, 353 N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); and Poindexter 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330
P.2d 763 (1958). The court said those cases involve "different considerations." State
v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d 124, 126 (Kan. 1974). Thus, the court does not foreclose
liability.
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regulating controlled items when it results in death would amount to
felony murder, where such statutes also regulate items like guns and
liquor.85 The Arizona, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania cases also reject
6
the California rule as an expropriation of legislative authority.1
C.

MANSLAUGHTER IN THE DRUG CONTEXT

Manslaughter appears to the be most agreed-upon form of homicide liability imposed in the drug context, with apparently only one
case rejecting such an approach. 7 Involuntary manslaughter consists
of two categories: 1) criminal-negligence manslaughter and 2) unlawful-act manslaughter. 8 The unlawful-act doctrine holds the defendant
liable for any unintended deaths that result from the commission of
an unlawful act.8 9 The unlawful-act doctrine was used in early cases
involving drugs and alcohol furnishers and is still used in California.
Negligent-act manslaughter is the more modern form of manslaughter
liability, especially in the drug-furnishing context, with most states
requiring an act of more than ordinary negligence which results in
death. Most jurisdictions require recklessness, conduct that causes a
high degree of risk of bodily injury or death and the actor's awareness
or conscious disregard of the risk created. The early case law in the
drug context almost universally imposed manslaughter.
The earliest case involving morphine appears to be Silver v.
Georgia.90 There, a Georgia appellate court upheld a conviction of
85. Mauldin, 529 P.2d at 126. A commentator makes a similar argument in a
discussion of California's second degree felony-murder rule imposing homicide
liability in the drug context in the absence of legislation. She points out that such an
approach would convict a gun dealer, who violates a felony statute by selling a gun,
of murder when that gun is used to kill. See Ramirez, Homicide Liability for the
Furnishing of Dangerous Narcotics, 6 ST. Louis U. 161, 172 (1987).
86. Arizona, in State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d 623 (1973), where the
court held that the sole act of selling heroin to a purchaser who later voluntarily
takes the drug outside the presence of the defendant and dies from an overdose could
not support felony-murder. Id. at 443, 511 P.2d at 625. The court noted that its role
was to interpret the murder statute, which lists the felonies for first degree murder,
then states "all other kinds of murder are of the second degree." Id. Emphasizing
the use of the word "murder" in the statute, the court stated that the statute "did
not provide that homicides committed during all unnamed felonies were second degree
murders. We think that the language used was used advisedly." Id. Accord, Tennessee, in State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984); and Pennsylvania, in
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1973).
87. People v. Pinckney, 65 Misc. 2d 265, 317 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1971), aff'd, 38
A.D.2d 217, 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). See supra note 23.
88. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 668.
89. Id. at 669.
90. 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913).
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involuntary manslaughter based on the unlawful-act doctrine. The
defendant, to relieve pain, injected a female companion with morphine
without a prescription, a misdemeanor. 91 In Brown v. Commonwealth92
a case factually similar to Silver,93 the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
then the highest court in the state, upheld the charge of involuntary

manslaughter based on either manslaughter theory, the negligent-act
or unlawful-act manslaughter rules. Similar results were reached in
another state in a moonshine case, where the court upheld a conviction
for involuntary manslaughter. 94 This form of homicide has also been

applied in cases where an abortion was illegally procured through the
use of harmful drugs and the pregnant woman died. 95

While the unlawful-act manslaughter doctrine, seen in Brown, is
generally not favored by commentators, it is currently used in Cali-

fornia. There, where the defendant's act consists of a misdemeanor,

such as supplying a small amount of drugs or aiding the deceased in
the misdemeanor to
obtaining or using drugs, courts have allowed
96

support manslaughter when the user dies.

The modern approach generally provides for manslaughter liability through the reckless act manslaughter analysis. Michigan best

reflects the modern approach in a case upholding manslaughter in the
drug furnishing context and rejecting the old distinctions between acts

91. Silver v. Georgia, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913). The court rejected
the defendant's argument that the unlawful act manslaughter doctrine can only be
applied to misdemeanors classified as malum in se, and not to misdemeanors clasified
as malum prohibitum. Malum in se refers to acts that are evil or bad while malum

prohibitum refers to acts that are merely prohibited by statute, but not necessarily
evil, such as traffic offenses. In Silver, the court stated that the question of what is
wrong or evil depends on the individual and environment. Id. at 725, 79 S.E. at 921.
92. 219 Ky. 406, 293 S.W. 975 (1927).
93. Brown v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 406, 408, 293 S.W. 975, 976-77 (1927).
The defendant injected morphine in a companion's arm at that person's request.
94. Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1921).
95. See Dunn v. People, 172 11. 582, 50 N.E. 137 (1898) (reversing defendant's
conviction on other grounds).
96. In People v. Mayfield, 225 Cal. App. 2d 263, 37 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1964) the
California appeals court rejected felony-murder because it found that the defendant
and deceased were co-purchasers of heroin and the defendant could not be guilty of
furnishing heroin, a felony. Later California cases, however, would allow a manslaughter conviction based on the unlawful act doctrine, with the misdemeanor of
aiding the decedent to use heroin as the unlawful act supporting manslaughter. See
People v. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d 107, 216 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1985); People v. Wong, 35
Cal. App. 3d 812, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1973). In State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943
(Tenn. 1984) the court also pointed out that a manslaughter conviction could be
upheld based on an unlawful killing in the commission of an unlawful act. 676
S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tenn. 1984).
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"malumprohibitum" and acts "malum in se." 97 In State v. Thomas, 98

the New Jersey superior court upheld manslaughter in the context of
a drug sale 99 and rejected the defendant's argument that the act of
the user in administering the drug was an independent intervening

cause, and held it was, at most, a concurrent cause of the user's
death.' °° The state of Washington has also allowed manslaughter

liability in the case of a simple sale or gift of drugs, though it is not
clear which manslaughter theory is being used. 10
Under the common law approaches in absence of specific legis-

lation, courts have had little difficulty convicting drug suppliers of
manslaughter for supplying drugs that cause a user's death. Freed

from the harsh consequences of a murder conviction, courts have
readily found the act of selling or giving away dangerous drugs to be
reckless. Courts are more inclined to impose manslaughter liability,
with its distinctly less severe punishment, than they are to impose first
or second degree murder liability. A typical result occurred in Napier
v. State, where the Alabama Supreme Court rejected depraved-heart
murder where the defendant gave away very pure heroin, 02 but later
let stand Napier's conviction on first degree manslaughter also based

on a theory of recklessness.0 3

Additionally, the causation problems associated with the felonymurder approach disappear under a manslaughter approach. While

causation is a limitation in the felony-murder approach, apparently
97. In People v. Meyer, 46 Mich. App. 357, 208 N.W.2d 230 (1973), for
example, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's motion to quash
his indictment charging manslaughter. Id. at 367, 208 N.W.2d 230, 235. The
indictment was based on the drug overdose death of a woman found in his apartment.
Id. Reflecting the modern approach, the court swept away common law classifications
of malum in se and malum prohibitum. "The crime of manslaughter is not based
upon a characterization of the act as being malum prohibitum or malum in se. Either
act will support a conviction for the crime of manslaughter provided it is accompanied
by a reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. (emphasis added).
98. 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32, cert. denied, 60 N.J. 513, 291 A.2d 374
(1972).
99. State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super., 377, 380, 288 A.2d 32, 34, cert. denied,
60 N.J. 513, 291 A.2d 374 (1972).
100. Id.
101. State v. Warwick, 16 Wash. App. 205, 555 P.2d 1386 (1976).
102. Napier v. State, 357 So. 2d 1011 (Ala. 1978) (While the court did not
explicitly state they were using depraved-heart murder, according to the principles
behind depraved-heart murder, supra note 11, the court, in effect, took this approach).
103. Napier v. State, 377 So. 2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), writ den'd, 377
So. 2d 1138 (Ala. 1979).
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no court has held causation to be lacking in the context of manslaughter. In short, the problems associated with imposing the most severe
form of homicide disappear when the least severe form of homicide
is being imposed.
III.

DRUG INDUCED HOMICIDE STATUTES: THE ILLINOIS STATUTE

Illinois' drug induced homicide statute' °4 states: "A person who
violates subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Section 401 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act' 05 by unlawfully delivering a controlled
substance to another, and any person dies as a result of the injection,
inhalation or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance,
commits the offense of drug induced homicide." 16 The statute imposes this form of murder on the provider of drugs and persons up
and down the user's chain of supply. 07 The language "and any person
to literally anyone who "dies as a result"
dies as a result" could apply
0 8
of the intake of drugs.
The Illinois approach, which creates a new category of homicide
specifically for situations where a person supplies drugs to a user who
takes the drugs and dies, is far more common than the drug felonymurder approach.' °9 One problem with adopting drug offenses as
underlying felonies supporting felony-murder is that such an approach
does not escape the felony-murder limitations which may be imposed. 110 In those jurisdictions, the mere sale that results in a user's
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (Supp. 1989).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2 para. 1401 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).

106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (Supp. 1989).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 102(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) defines
"deliver" or "delivery" as the "actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration, whether or not there
is an agency relationship." Id.
108. How far this liability extends appears to be an open question. The legislative
intent appears to be not to let a dealer "off the hook" merely because he did not
deliver to the deceased but in fact delivered to someone else who delivered to the
deceased. "The offense of drug induced homicide will allow for the prosecution of
any person in the chain delivery of drugs," said Senator Jones during debate on the
statute. Illinois Senate Debate, June 24, 1988, p. 92.
109. The drug felony murder approach, adopted only in Arizona, consists of
merely including drug felonies-selling or delivery-as underlying felonies for the
felony-murder approach. All eleven other drug induced homicide statutes are a new,
separate form of homicide that operates in a manner identical to the felony-murder
approach. The approach Illinois adopted is similar to the statutes passed by Connecticut, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin.
110. The causation limitations and the limitation requiring a felony dangerous
to life in the abstract.
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death may not be sufficient to impose homicide liability on a drug
supplier.
Under the statutory approach, however, a major question is
whether the felony-murder limitations will apply to these new drug
induced homicide statutes. Those statutes, like Illinois', state that a
person commits drug induced homicide when the person commits a
particular drug offense"' (usually a felony offense) and a user dies
from taking the drugs." 2 Because these statutes operate in a manner
identical to the felony-murder rule, the felony murder limitations may
apply. One limitation, however, the causation requirement that the
death occur during the "commission" of the drug felony, cannot
apply to these statutory schemes." 3 A drug induced homicide statute
may also do away with the other major felony-murder limitation: the
requirement of underlying felony dangerous to life in the abstract. It
could be argued the legislature's action in creating a drug induced
homicide statute points out the danger of the underlying felony. On
the other hand, courts hostile to the new statutes could hold the
danger from a drug sale is not great enough to allow this extension
of the felony-murder rule.
This new category of homicide does eliminate the stretching courts
have done to reach drug dealers under the common law felony-murder
and depraved-heart murder approaches. Courts will now be able to
apply the new law to a situation which seems to have slipped between
the cracks at common law. Legislatures passing drug induced homicide
statutes have also removed the major reason courts have refused to
impose homicide liability in the drug furnishing context-the absence
of legislation. With legislation in place, courts will be much more
supportive of drug induced homicide prosecutions. In interpreting this
new classification of homicide, however, problems may arise in the
context of what mental state to apply and what causation to require.
Because this new form of homicide liability operates almost
identically to felony murder, one solution is to treat the new statutes

111. See supra note 8.
112. See infra note 156 for the exact language. (Most, like the Illinois statute,
require only the underlying drug offense and a user's death as a result of taking the
drugs).
113. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. While felony murder statutes
often contain the requirement that the death occur during the attempt or commission
of a felony, the drug induced homicide statutes, with the exception of the Arizona
statute, do not contain such language. For that reason, courts cannot conclude that
the felony of supplying the drug was over once the money and drugs exchanged
hands.

1989:5371

ILLINOIS' DRUG INDUCED HOMICIDE STA TUTE

as extensions of the felony-murder doctrine. If, on the other hand,
courts treat the statutes like any other criminal law (thus requiring a
separate mental state for the death and strict causation), these statutes
may be unenforceable.
A.

MENTAL STATE IN THE ILLINOIS STATUTE

There are two possible interpretations of the mental state requirement: 1) an unstated intent thus by operation of the statute, at least
recklessness;"14 or, 2) the intent of the underlying drug offense. Of
these alternatives, the most likely to be applied is the intent for the
drug offense. The approach would, like the felony-murder doctrine,
effectively impose strict liability on the drug felon for the resulting
death. The plain meaning of the statute would support the mental
state requirement being satisfied by the commission of the underlying
offense. Given the severity of the sentence and the statutory limitations
on strict liability crimes, the legislature could not legally have intended
a pure strict liability approach." 5
1.

Unstated Therefore Recklessness as the Mental State

If courts reject the felony-murder approach to the mental state,
the statute may be read as a crime without an intent. Courts would
then find their role in interpreting the statute to include articulating
the requisite mental state. By operation of Illinois' mental state
7
formulation," 6 at least recklessness would be required." Under the
recklessness standard, the required finding would be the supplier's act
of selling the drug was likely to cause death or great bodily harm and
such an act was a gross deviation of the standard of care a reasonable
114. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-3(b) (1988).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-9 (1988) requires that "the statute defining
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the
offense
the
conduct described." Like the Model Penal Code, Illinois law requires that if the
statute's mental state is to be absolute liability, the statute must clearly indicate such
a legislative purpose. Illinois courts are reluctant to treat any crimes except vehicle
violations as absolute liability crimes. In his book on Illinois criminal law, John
Decker points out that courts have treated chapter 38 crimes as requiring mens rea
even where the offense, for example, criminal trespass, is a minor one. J. DECKER,
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW 95 (1986) [hereinafter DECKER]. "The court typically concludes that if the offense carries the substantial consequence of imprisonment and
large fines, strict liability is not warranted." Id. at 95.
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-3(b) (1988).
117. Id.
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person would exercise."' This would appear to be a high burden to
meet because the court would have to find that the act of selling
drugs is likely to cause death or great bodily harm. In Illinois, acts
defined as reckless have included pointing a loaded pistol at another, 119
handling an infant so roughly that the infant dies 120 and failing to
adequately care for a child.' 21 If the Illinois courts were to interpret
the statute as requiring a mental state of at least recklessness, very
few drug suppliers would be punished within its framework. If courts
must conclude the natural, probable, and likely result of a drug sale
is the user's death in order to impose this form of homicide, Illinois'
drug induced homicide statute will most likely die through judicial
interpretation.
2.

Felony-Murder Type Mental State-The Drug Offense Mental
State

Based on the plain meaning of the statute, Illinois courts will
most likely transfer the intent from the drug offense to the resulting
death. Doing so would appear to be the closest approximation to the
mental state the legislature envisioned for this statute. The statute
operates in a manner identical to the felony-murder rule. Under this
approach, even if the act of selling drugs is held to be not dangerous
enough or the likelihood of death not great enough to support the
mental state of recklessness, the mental state requirement would be
satisfied by the mental state required under the drug offense. The
drug statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401, states "it is
unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or deliver, or
possess with intent to manufacture or deliver." (emphasis added) The
mental state requirement under the drug statute is thus satisfied by a
showing of knowledge or intent. While this will create a new extension
of the felony-murder rule, it does not appear to be so great a departure
from the felony-murder rule that Illinois courts would invalidate the
statute.
Even under a felony-murder type mental state, which allows the
intent for the underlying offense to satisfy the homicide's mental
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-6 (1988) Under a recklessness approach the
mental state the court would have to find that the defendant "consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk ... and such disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the
situation. "
119. People v. Schwartz, 64 Ill. App. 3d 989, 382 N.E.2d 59 (1978).
120. People v. Yocum, 122 Ill. App. 2d 126, 257 N.E.2d 793, 794 n.1 (1970).

121. People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1959).
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state, problems may arise. One possible interpretation of the mental
state under the felony-murder approach could doom the statute. All
that is required in Illinois under the felony-murder doctrine is: "(1)
evidence that shows the defendant was a participant in a forcible
felony and (2) evidence that shows an innocent party was killed during
the commission of the felony as a direct and foreseeable consequence
of it. ' ' 122 The forcible felony requirement12 1 is a codified version of
the common law requirement that the felony-murder rule only applies
24
to dangerous or inherently dangerous underlying felonies.
Since the drug induced homicide statute does not require a
forcible felony, Illinois courts may require a finding that the underlying drug charge is inherently dangerous. It is possible Illinois courts,
like the California and Virginia courts, will find that drug deliveries
alone are dangerous enough to form the basis for this type of
homicide.' 25 But if Illinois follows those jurisdictions which require
the defendant's conduct to be inherently dangerous, with the natural,
likely and probable result of death, courts may invalidate the drug
induced homicide statute.126 The other requirement of Illinois' felonymurder statute appears not to be satisfied either. The second requirement, that an innocent party is killed during the commission of the
felony, may not be met by the new law. If Illinois courts strictly apply
the felony-murder limitation and hold that the user of lethal drugs is
not "innocent" within the meaning of the statute because the user is
also breaking the law, the statute may be unenforceable.
The mental state issue has been successfully tackled by other
states in several ways. New Jersey achieves specificity by titling its
' 27
drug induced homicide act "Strict liability for drug-induced deaths.'
122. People v. Tillman, 70 Ill. App. 3d 922, 926, 388 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (1979).
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(3) (1988).
124. All forcible felonies, by their very nature, are inherently dangerous. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-8 (1987).
125. One commentator notes the general perception that every time a user takes
an illegal drug such as heroin there is a strong possibility of overdose is false. She
calculates that of an estimated 179 million heroin injections in 1983, only 632 deaths
occurred, creating a .00035%, or 3.5 in a million chance of death with each injection.

Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: the Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the Supply
of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671, 689 (1986).

126. If the court fails to find sales or deliveries themselves to be inherently
dangerous, courts could require an amount or profit from the delivery that would
indicate that the deliverer is a drug dealer. Drug dealers are the more culpable persons
in the drug chain. Their activity is more dangerous than the person who makes no
profit but merely obtains drugs for a fellow user or has incidental contact with the
drugs.
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West Supp. 1988).
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Minnesota's drug induced homicide statute, categorized as third degree
murder, uses the language "[w]hoever, without intent to cause death,
proximately causes the death of a human being.' ' 2 This clearly states
strict liability is being imposed upon the actor for the death. Nevada's
definition of murder requires an "unlawful killing of a human being,
with malice aforethought, either express or implied, or caused by a
controlled substance which was sold to a person in violation of
29
[Nevada's drug statute]."1
While it is hard to predict what mental state Illinois courts will
require, it seems likely the requisite mental state for the drug offense
will satisfy the drug induced homicide mental state requirement as
well. The Illinois court has upheld a very broad interpretation of the
felony-murder doctrine making it appear likely the court will allow
this sort of transfer of intent from the drug offense to the homicide.
Cases discussed in section III. B. demonstrate the relaxed causation
required under Illinois' felony-murder rule.
The lack of a specified mental state for the killing, in effect
resulting in strict liability for the user's death, is a major defect in
this statute. The modern approach in criminal law, encompassed in
the Model Penal Code'30 and the Illinois statute on mental state,"3 is
to require a specific mental state for each crime. In the context of
drug induced homicide laws, it is useful to recall the history of the
felony-murder doctrine. 3 2 At common law, all felonies were capital
crimes. As more minor crimes were elevated to felonies, the English
courts began limiting the doctrine to either felonies involving acts of
violence or felonies where death is the natural and probable consequence.' 33 But today, when felonies include such crimes as eavesdropping, the felony-murder rationale is illogical in contexts outside crimes
where the death "is the natural or probable consequence" of the
34
defendant's conduct.
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) (West Supp. 1989).
129. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.010 (Michie 1986).
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 Comment 4 (1985).
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 4-3 (1987).
132. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 622-623 (for a history of the felonymurder doctrine).
133. In 1957 England abolished the felony-murder rule. J. DECKER, ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL LAW at 191 n.76 (1986) [hereinafter DECKER] (citing Homicide Act of 1957,
5 & 6 ELIZ. II, c. 11, § 1 (1957)).
134. The felony-murder rule has been often criticized because it eliminates the
requirement for a mental state for the killing. See Roth & Sundby, The FelonyMurder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446
(1985). See also Crump and Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 359 (1985).
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Solution to the Lack of a Mental State

The best way to solve this problem is for the legislature to clarify
the mental state issue through amendment. To give effect to the
legislative intent, a mental state should be fashioned in language
similar to the Minnesota statute which states: "Whoever, without
intent to cause death.' ' 35 This language best reflects the intent of the
Illinois General Assembly to impose this form of homicide without a
mental state for the death, requiring only the underlying drug delivery
offense. An even simpler solution would be to title the statute "strict
13 6
liability for drug-induced deaths" as the New Jersey legislature did.
Whether the Illinois legislature acts, courts will be forced to make
some decision as to the statute's mental state requirement, even if the
courts decide to allow the statute to operate in the same manner as
the felony-murder rule. However, since the felony-murder rule historically involved felonies dangerous to life, courts should require the
same in the context of drug induced homicide. This would be consistent with the felony-murder rule in Illinois, which is limited to forcible
felonies where danger to life is foreseeable, and would be consistent
with California's common law second degree felony-murder rule.
The danger in this context could be demonstrated by any delivery;
however, courts should require some showing of drug dealing or
profit on the part of the deliverer in order to ensure that only drug
dealers are convicted, since the sentence is almost as severe as first
degree murder. Culpability required for a homicide conviction should
be greater than the culpability required under a drug statute. The
statute is aimed at drug dealers; the courts should give that intent
effect. By requiring the showing of a "for profit" delivery the court
will be requiring that the person be a dealer and not someone "doing
a favor" for a friend. This result is also consistent with Connecticut's
statute, which requires "the illegal sale, for economic gain."' 37 The
court should not merely allow all 401(a) or (b) deliveries to satisfy
the requirements of drug induced homicide.
B.

CAUSATION UNDER THE ILLINOIS STATUTE: FELONY-MURDER OR
STRICT CAUSATION?

Another question open for interpretation under this new statute
is what form of causation will be required. One deciding factor will
again be whether the court views the statute as an extension of the
135. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 (West Supp. 1987).
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West Supp. 1987).
137. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b(6) (1985).
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felony-murder doctrine, or treats the statute as it would any other
crime, thus requiring strict causation. Strict causation requires that
the defendant's conduct (or underlying felony in the felony-murder
rule) be the actual cause 3 ' and proximate or "legal" cause of death. 3 9
Under the felony-murder causation or strict causation, the proximate
or legal cause test will bar conviction where the death occurs from an
intervening act following the defendant's conduct that was not foreseeable from the commission of the felony. 14° Illinois adopts a "but
for" or "chain reaction" type of causation under the felony-murder
rule. Thus causation is satisfied where the defendant's commission of
the felony sets in motion a chain of events leading to someone's death
4
so long as the death was a foreseeable consequence.1 '
Under either felony-murder or conventional homicide causation, however, it seems unlikely the court will limit this new form
of homicide through a causation analysis. The corpus delicti or
proof of a homicide under Illinois law has two elements: "1) the
fact of death and 2) the fact that the death was caused by the
criminal agency of some person.' ' 42 Strict causation allows the
138. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 627-28. In most cases, the "but for"
test of criminal conduct, that but for the act, the death would not have occurred, is

sufficient to establish cause in fact. But the use of torts type causation is discouraged
in criminal law because it is generally recognized that doing so would lead to an
explosion in criminal liability.
139. The "legal" or proximate cause test requires that the death occurs in a way
similar to the way the defendant intended or, in crimes of recklessness, in a way
similar enough to the manner of death that his conduct created to make it fair to
hold the defendant responsible for that result. Id. at 278. Even if what happens
differs from what the actor thought would happen, or happens in a way different
from the way intended or hazarded by the conduct.
140. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 627. For the argument that causation
is not satisfied under the drug felony-murder approach, see Note, An Unconstitutional
Fiction: the Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L.REV.
671 (1986).
141. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 56 11. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974), where

the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a felony-murder conviction where the defendant
intended only to rob the deceased, who died after jumping out of the window to
escape the robber. "It is unimportant that the defendant did not anticipate the precise
sequence of events that followed upon his entry into the apartment .... His unlawful

act precipitated those events, and he is responsible for the consequences." Id. at 334,
307 N.E.2d at 355-56. See also People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511
(1974) upholding felony-murder where the defendants burglarized a warehouse and
fled. Later, a police officer shot and killed another officer while searching the area
around the warehouse. "Those who commit forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance .

142.

. . ."

Id. at 94, 310 N.E.2d at 513.
note 133, p. 203 (citation omitted).

DECKER, supra
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defendant's act to be the cause of death if there is no intervening
act to break the chain. 14 3 An intervening act or contributing cause
must be supervening or independent of the defendant's act to break
the chain of causation.144 Dependent causes flow naturally or fore145
seeably from the defendant's act and do not not break causation.
In the drug induced homicide context, the user's act of taking the
drugs would probably be considered a foreseeable dependent cause
and thus not break the causation chain.
Using felony-murder type causation, there should be no problem finding sufficient causation in the context of a sale under the
new statute. Under the felony-murder rule, "normal rules of causation are not relevant.' 1 46 In People v. Brackett,147 for example,
the defendant was convicted of felony-murder for the beating and
rape of an 85-year-old woman who choked to death five weeks later
in a nursing home after being force-fed. The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the conviction and rejected the argument that causation was
insufficient for a conviction. "It is not the law in this state that the
1 48
defendant's acts must be the sole and immediate cause of death.
The court also stated: "this is precisely the kind of case where the
defendant takes his victim as he finds him.' ' 49 Thus, under either
felony-murder or conventional murder causation, it appears unlikely
Illinois courts would find causation to be a limitation, even in the
context of a simple delivery. Causation under the new statute would
probably require: 1) the fact of a death and 2) the fact that the
death was caused by drugs delivered by the defendant in violation
of the drug statute.
An interesting solution to the causation requirement is presented
by the Tennessee statute, 50 which holds drug providers liable for
second degree murder "when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user . . . ."I" Such a clear statement
of causation on the part of the Tennessee legislature makes it easier
for courts to interpret and apply the law.
143.
144.
145.
146.
939, 941,
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

DECKER,

Id.
Id.

supra note 133, p. 206.

supra note 133, p. 207, citing People v. Burke, 85 I11.App. 3d
407 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1st Dist. 1980).
117 I11.2d 170, 510 N.E.2d 877 (1987).
People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 176, 510 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1987).
Id. at 178, 510 N.E.2d at 881.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-211(b) (1982).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-211(b) (West Supp. 1988).
DECKER,
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A causation problem created by the Illinois statute is the issue
of whose death triggers the imposition of drug induced homicide.
The Illinois statute states: "and any person dies as a result of the
injection, inhalation or ingestion" of the drugs.'12 This language
opens the door to three possible interpretations. One is the language
''any person dies as a result" would refer to the drug user's death
from an overdose. A second interpretation would be the user's death
from actions taken under the influence of the drugs, for example,
jumping out of a window. A third would be the death of anyone
killed by the drug user as a "result" of his drug ingestion. An
example of this would be the user stabbing someone to death while
under the influence of the drugs.' 53 It is not clear the Illinois General
Assembly intended the second or third interpretations, but the
statute is not drafted with enough specificity to preclude such

possibilities. 114

While the legislature probably intended the drug user's death
to trigger the drug induced homicide statute, another, broader
interpretation is possible. For example: A and B pool their money
to buy three grams of cocaine. B gets the drugs while A, the driver,
stays in the car. As soon as B hands A his half of the drugs, A
ingests the drugs. A begins driving extremely fast, and hits a school
bus, killing ten children. Under this scenario, it is possible B would
be convicted of drug induced homicide, while A is convicted of the
lesser offense of reckless homicide. Since B has delivered, but A
has not, only B could be charged with drug induced homicide. It is
possible a court would read the statutory language "and any person
152. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (West Supp. 1989).
153. In State v. Clayton, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the court
upheld the defendant's conviction of third degree murder based on the underlying
felony of "possession" of a hallucinogenic drug that the defendant ingested before
he inexplicably stabbed a passerby to death. The Kansas Supreme Court, in State v.
Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983), where the defendant was charged with
possession of cocaine in her body, rejected the notion that cocaine in the body could
form the basis of possession. The court also rejected the finding of cocaine in the
blood as adequate circumstantial evidence to show prior possession. Id. at 213.
154. The earlier drafts of the bill show an intent to impose this form of homicide
when "the recipient" dies. House Bill 4125 Amendment No. 3, 85th Gen. Assembly
(withdrawn amendment unpublished, copy on file at NIU Law Review). Later, when
the bill was expanded to allow for prosecution of others up and down the "drug
chain" of delivery to the deceased user, the "recipient" language was removed. H.R.
4125, Amendment No. 4, 85th Gen. Assembly, Illinois House of Representatives,
House Journal (May 18, 1988). Whether this expansion was intended only to spread
liability to others in the delivery chain or to include third parties killed by acts of
the users is not clear.
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dies as a result of the injection, [or] inhalation""15 to allow B's
conviction of drug induced homicide. The language "as a result of
the ingestion" could mean either the user dies as a result of an
overdose, or third parties die as a "result" of the ingestion, i.e.,
driving under the influence of drugs. The "but for" proximate

cause test, but for the ingestion, would the car crash have occurred,
would appear to be satisfied under this hypothetical.

A judicial solution to this problem could be reached through
interpretation of causation, especially proximate or legal causation.
Deaths of users from drug overdoses are a foreseeable consequence
flowing from drug deliveries. Deaths to others, however, could be

viewed as the result of an intervening cause that is independent or
supervening. In the above scenario, A's reckless driving could be
an intervening act that breaks the causation chain. But, if the
intervening act is dependent on the original drug delivery, causation
would not be broken. The fact that nine of the twelve states to have
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
The drug induced homicide statute as first introduced (Amendment No. 1 to House
Bill 4125) was limited to the person who delivers to another and the other person
delivers to someone who takes the drugs and dies, but only if the person charged
knew or should have known the person he was delivering to was likely to deliver the
drugs to another. Basically, the statute addressed only this situation: A delivers to
B, B delivers to C, who takes the drugs and dies. A is guilty of the drug induced
homicide of C but B is not.
Amendment No. 3 to House Bill 4125 narrowed the scope of the statute in a
very workable manner by imposing the homicide on a person who delivers to another
"and that recipient dies as a result of the injection, inhalation or ingestion of any
amount of that controlled substance." That language clearly limited the imposition
to the death of the user, but it did not address the chain of delivery problem because
only the person who delivered to the dead user would be liable for homicide. Under
the scenario above, B would be guilty, but not A. Amendment No. 4 to House Bill
4125 added the language "and any person dies as a result," broadening the statute
to encompass anyone in the chain of delivery, but unfortunately removing the
language "and that recipient dies."
While the legislature may have intended the language "dies as a result of the
injection .

. . ."

to limit this form of homicide to the death of users only, there is

potential for a more sweeping interpretation. The word "any person" has two
meanings in the statute: anyone who receives the drugs and dies of an overdose (thus
giving a broad meaning to delivery but not to who dies) or, anyone who dies from
an act committed by a person on drugs (thus -giving the statute extremely broad
scope). The Illinois statute should be written more clearly, perhaps stating like the
Wisconsin statute: "by manufacturer or delivery of a controlled substance ...
another human being uses and dies as a result of that use." Wisc. STAT.

which

ANN.

§

940.02 (West Supp. 1988). That language makes it clear exactly whose death triggers
the imposition of drug induced homicide.
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passed drug induced homicide statutes limit the crime to cases where
the user dies indicates the Illinois statute was poorly drafted in this
respect.
Most states that passed drug induced homicide laws dealt with
this question by explicitly limiting the statute to the death of the
user to whom the unlawful delivery was made. Nine of the twelve
drug-induced homicide statutes clearly limit the imposition of this
form of homicide to when the user dies, 5 6 while only two statutes
impose this form of homicide for the death of any person who dies
either directly or indirectly due to the drug offense. 5' 7 Rhode Island
imposes this form of homicide only where the defendant has been
convicted of selling or delivering drugs to a minor and the minor's
58
death results from ingesting those drugs.
A legislative solution to this problem is for the General Assembly to change the language "and any person dies" to "and any user
dies." By changing the "person" to "user," the Illinois statute
would conform with the other nine statutes that only allow drug
induced homicide prosecutions when drug users die. The specificity
found in the majority of the statutes imposing drug induced homicide is more desirable than the broad Illinois statute.
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b(6) (West 1988) ("to a person who dies
as a direct result of the use . . . ."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(l)(a)(3) (West Supp.
1988) ("proximate cause of the death of the user"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:30.1A(3) (West Supp. 1988) ("direct cause of the death of the recipient who
ingested or consumed the controlled dangerous substance"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.010 (1988) (murder is the unlawful killing with malice aforethought or caused
by a controlled substance sold in violation of Nevada's drug statutes); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-9. (West Supp. 1988) (reading statute as a whole indicates the death
sought to be punished is of the user); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-6 ("death has resulted
to such minor because of the ingestion"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-211(b) (Michie
Supp. 1988) ("drug is . . . proximate cause of the death of the user"); WASH.

REV.

§ 69.50.415(a) (West Supp. 1988) ("resulting in death of the user"); and
WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2)(a) (West Supp. 1988) ("which another human being
uses and dies as a result of that use").
157. Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105.A.2 (West Supp. 1988) ("in the course
CODE ANN.

of . . . such offense . . . such person or another person causes the death of any

person"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) (West Supp. 1988) (third degree murder
imposed to whoever "proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering ... a controlled
substance") and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20.(4) (West Supp. 1988) (first degree
manslaughter imposed using the same language as above except that drugs involved
are schedule III, IV or V, and not schedule I or II).
158. See supra note 156.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

1. Notice
To accord a defendant due process of the law as required by
the fourteenth amendment'" the defendant must have been given
notice of the prohibited conduct. 60 The statute must be specific
6
enough to put persons on notice that the behavior is criminalized.1 1
While the Illinois statute does not clearly indicate whose death
triggers the imposition of drug induced homicide, that problem does
not seem great enough to support a holding of unconstitutionality
for failure to give notice. It is widely known that selling and
delivering drugs is illegal, and the creation of a new statute, published in the usual manner, should satisfy the notice requirement.
2.

Proportionality

Another constitutional requirement, under the eighth amendment,162 is the punishment not be disproportional to the accepted
norm for punishing the offense in other jurisdictions. The Supreme
Court used this doctrine to invalidate a life sentence for a thirdtime offender whose last offense was writing a bad check for $100.163
The test for proportionality is threefold: first, the seriousness of
the offense and severity of penalty; second, whether more serious
offenses carry the same or lesser penalties, and third, the sentences
for the same crime in other states. 64 Based on this test and the
cases the Supreme Court has found to violate its proportionality
test, it appears the Illinois statute is not unconstitutional. First, the crime is serious, as is the sentence. Second, more serious crimes are
not punished equally or less severely; and third, more than a dozen
other states would impose similar sentences in this context and three
states make drug induced homicide a capital offense. Thus, it does
not appear Illinois' drug induced homicide sentence requirements
are disproportional and thus unconstitutional.
3.

Lesser/Included Offense Question
One issue which seems easily resolved is the question of whether

the drug offense under ILL.

REV. STAT.

159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401 is a

United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1962).
Id. at 33.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Id. at 278.
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lesser or included offense under the drug induced homicide statute.
Based on the statutory definition, an included offense "is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts . . . than
that which is required to establish the commission of the offense
charged .... "165 This test is a codification of the Supreme Court's
test articulated in Blockburger v. United States.166 Proving drug
induced homicide first involves proving all the facts underlying the
drug charge, then proving the death was caused by drugs supplied
by the defendant. The drug charge is established by less than all of
the facts required to prove the homicide charge, making the drug
charge an included offense. If a jury were to return a guilty verdict
on both charges, the judge should simply vacate the drug conviction
67
as an included offense of the homicide. 1
D.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ILLINOIS STATUTE

During the election year of 1988, the Illinois General Assembly
appeared to be laboring under an obsessive get-tough-on-drugs atmosphere. 16 As one senator pointed out, statutes getting tough on
crime are rarely voted down by the legislature. "This is a terrible bill,
but like all these terrible bills that involved the Criminal Code, this
bill will pass just like the rest of them.' ' 69 In other words, the General
Assembly did not look to the finer points of the law regarding mental
state and causation when drafting this criminal law. This section will
discuss five identified problems associated with the Illinois drug
induced homicide statute: 1) overbroadness-the statute could operate
to impose homicide liability on persons who are not responsible for
the death; 2) arbitrariness of the statute and thus the lack of deterrence
value since it imposes homicide in such an arbitrary fashion; 3) lack
of sentence flexibility; 4) severity of sentence compared to the common
law crime; and 5) the lack of recognition that the user must take
some responsibility and assume some risk when ingesting potentially
lethal drugs.
165. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-9 (1987).

166. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
167. This result is also consistent with more recent Supreme Court cases to apply
the Blockburger test. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977).
168. The source for this is the original bill, read in the House on April 13, 1988.
The House Journal for that day merely says that the bill was read and ordered
printed. See infra text accompanying note 170.
169. Ill. Sentate Debates on H.B. 4125, 85th Gen. Assembly (statement of Sen.
D'Arco (June 24, 1988)) (available on microfiche #122 at 94).
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Overbroadnessof the Illinois Statute

Based on the plain meaning of the Illinois statute, the legislature
has fullfilled its intent to be tough on drug dealers. But, there is
evidence the statute is aimed at the wrong people. Its wide sweep is
more likely to punish the deceased user's friends and fellow users
than the actual drug dealers. While one legislator said: "It's high time
we got after these miserable drug pushers who've made . . . a travesty
of the lives of young people,"' 70 the legislators seemed to forget the
statute they passed is likely to reach only a small number of drug
1 71
dealers.
The statute as written is too broad. Under the statute, the
deceased user's friends and drug companions will face the 15-year
minimum conviction far more often than actual drug dealers. Several
hypotheticals indicate this likely result. Two persons pool their money
to buy three grams of cocaine. They drive to a dealer. The driver of
the car, A, stays in the car while B gets the drugs. As they drive
away, B gives A his half of the purchase. A later takes the drugs and
dies. Under this hypothetical, B has committed a violation of section
401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, knowingly delivering
1 72
or possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.
"Delivery means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of
possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration . .. 173 Must a judge sentence B to at least fifteen years, and
no more than thirty years, or, if B is worthy of an extended term,
not less than thirty years and not more than sixty years? 74 With the
harsh minimum sentence, a judge cannot consider the facts that
perhaps A and B were high school students trying cocaine for the
first time, or that it was A who wanted to try cocaine and B went
along as a favor, or B and A have spotless records and are both
honor students.
Changing the facts, should the result change if B dies and A is
charged with drug induced homicide for B's death under an accom170. Id. (statement of Sen. Geo-Karis).
171. Only a few dealers are unlucky enough to have a customer die from using
drugs. In Illinois, deaths from heroin and cocaine from 1980 to 1987 has climbed to
about 124 a year. In 1987, sixty-seven persons died from overdoses of opiate, and
fifty-seven persons are listed as having died from local anaesthetics, the category
which includes cocaine. Illinois Department of Public Health Annual Death Table
No. 7, years: 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1102(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3.3 (West Supp. 1989).
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plice liability theory?'75 Or, if A and B purchase from a curbside
seller and B's conduct consists of passing money from A to the seller
and drugs from the seller to A? What if A is an experienced user of
lethal drugs, B a neophyte, and A dies because, as an experienced
user, he takes a larger dose?
An entirely different scenario also reveals how many non-drug
dealers may be caught in the net of this law. A, B, C and D are
engaging in a drug party with mutually shared narcotics. A dies. Are
B, C and D guilty of drug induced homicide? Who is guilty if: 1) A
dies from an overdose of barbiturates brought by B? 2) A dies from
a combination of barbiturates (from B) and cocaine, brought by C?
3) A is under the influence of LSD brought by D and A walks out
of the 20th floor window thinking he can fly?
Should the result change if A, B, C and D melt their combined
drugs in a pot and: 1) A dies as a result of a drug overdose, but it
cannot be determined which drugs contributed to the death in what
degrees? 2) None of the survivors, B, C and D, can remember who
brought what drugs? 3) None of the survivors want to take A to the
hospital after he began showing overdose signs because they were
afraid of being accused of drug induced homicide? 4) B goes to great
lengths to keep A alive, performing CPR and calling paramedics?
A final hypothetical is in order. A, B, C and D are sitting in a
row, in that order, at a concert from left to right facing the stage. A
pipe with more than one gram of crack in it is being passed along the
row coming from D's side. The pipe is E's, who is sitting thirty seats
over. D passes the pipe to C, who passes it to B, who passes it to A.
A inhales from the pipe and dies. Who is guilty of drug induced
homicide in this case? It would appear that B, C and D have all
"delivered" under the definition of deliver and "any person" has
died as a result. Should it change the result if C put more crack in
the pipe? Is E criminally responsible? Does it matter if E filled the
pipe with marijuana and F, sitting fifteen seats from A, filled the
pipe with crack? What if B inhales and dies? Can only C and D be
charged with homicide because they had possession of the pipe before
B? Could A be charged under accomplice liability?
These scenarios show some of the possible" persons who may be
snared in the drug induced homicide net. Being charged with this new
statutory form of homicide, carrying a severe penalty, should not
depend on the seating arrangement at a concert. Nor should the mere
act of passing drugs from one automobile passenger to another carry
175. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, para. 5-1, 5-2 (1987).
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the consequence of an automatic fifteen year sentence. Nor should
homicide liability depend on exactly who brought what kind of drugs
to a party, and who touched what drug before the deceased died.
While the Illinois General Assembly clearly intended this statute to
apply to drug dealers,' 76 it is equally clear this law will have a far
broader sweep. Anyone who takes drugs with the deceased user, or
anyone who may have assisted him in obtaining the drugs even as a
favor to the user with no monetary consideration involved, may have
committed acts which constitute delivery under the drug statute and
may support a homicide conviction.
One solution to the statute's overbroadness is for the legislature
to amend, or the courts to interpret, the law to require some form of
consideration for the drug delivery. While the drug offenses do not
require consideration under the definition of delivery, for the purposes
of drug induced homicide, consideration should be required. Consideration could include: money, drugs or sexual favors. Requiring
consideration would give effect to the legislature's declared intention
of imposing this offense on drug dealers and traffickers while alleviating the otherwise harsh result. For drug induced homicide purposes,
the delivery element should incorporate consideration.
While it makes sense, for example, to charge a person for delivery
of drugs when he gives a fellow user two grams of cocaine, for the
purposes of drug induced homicide, it does not make sense to allow
such an act, absent the culpability of a for-profit drug dealer, to
support a "murder charge." The stigma attached to the drug induced
homicide charge and the heavy sentence such a conviction holds
warrants a showing of greater culpability than that of mere drug
possession and use.
This distinction is simple and workable. It imposes the homicide
liability to those most culpable-the drug dealers. As the Florida
court in Martin held, the drug dealer is the principal in the crime of77
drug induced homicide even when he delivers through a middleman.'
The Martin court intuitively reached the right result-the drug dealer
is the one who stands to profit and should be the one to pay for the
death. If one dies from his profit-making venture, it is sensible to
hold him criminally liable for the death. In this way a greater and
more accurately placed deterrence is created. Becoming liable for

176.
narcotics
note 169,
177.

As demonstrated by Sen. Jones: "[I]t's a bill dealing with drugs and
for those persons who are trafficking drugs." Illinois Senate Debates, supra
at 96 (statement of Sen. Jones).
377 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 1979).
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homicide when a user dies becomes a cost of doing business for the
drug dealer.
This solution also works in the situation where a drug dealer
provides free drugs for a "party" or user in the anticipation of future
8 The
sales, the situation that occurred in Heacock."1
consideration is
the dealer's anticipation of future drug sales. Nor would the distinction allow the user who sells drugs to supply his own habit to escape
the liability of drug induced homicide. His consideration is the drugs
he gains from the deal to supply his own habit.
Creating this distinction for drug induced homicide has the benefit
of targeting only those who the legislature intended to target. It seems
clear that the legislature did not take into account the liberal definition
of "delivery" when writing the drug induced homicide statute. Creating the distinction also allows those less culpable-friends and fellow
users who are not drug dealers-to escape homicide liability. However,
the distinction does not allow them to escape the crime of delivery,
which also carries a severe penalty.
Another possible solution to cure the statute's overbroadness
would entail the Illinois courts requiring, as does the felony-murder
doctrine, a showing that the drug offense is dangerous or inherently
dangerous in the abstract. Courts could hold danger is shown by
either the quantity of drugs delivered, or profit making. Both of these
characteristics are indicative of drug dealers and not casual users
passing drugs among themselves. The defendant who makes a profit
on a delivery shows a higher degree of culpability. The defendant that
makes money from dealing drugs is engaging in activity that is more
dangerous than the person who merely picks up the drugs for a friend.
The one who profits is also more likely to be engaged in the business
of drug dealing. When profit becomes involved, the conduct is clearly
more culpable.
2.

ArbitrarinessCauses a Lack of Deterrence Value in Statute
Statutes that punish arbitrarily and not based on culpability do
not create the deterrence desired in criminal law to prevent the
commission of crimes. The statute is arbitrary because it punishes
only those who deliver drugs to a person who subsequently dies or
who kills a third party as a result of taking those drugs. The statute
does not punish based on the culpability of the person making a
delivery. It does not matter whether two grams or twenty kilos of
cocaine were sold. The statute's harsh sentence is based on the fact
178. Commonwealth v. Heacock, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
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that the act of delivering drugs resulted in harm, the death of a
user. 79 The resulting harm doctrine creates criminality or increases
criminality when harm results from the criminal act. For example,
driving recklessly by deliberately swerving into the opposite lane is
not criminal until another car approaches. In the drug induced
homicide context, two drug dealers are treated differently based on
the resulting harm of their actions when one sells drugs and a user
dies, and the other merely sells drugs that kill no one. 1°
Since the statute only punishes drug dealers and fellow users of
a deceased user, the statute is not likely to have much deterrence
effect on drug dealers or users. The underlying policy of the statute
appears to be based on retaliation or retribution for the death.
Commentator Dean Schulhofer explains that supporters of the retaliation theory of harm and punishment claim "that official retaliation
may be necessary as an alternative to the greater evil of mob violence."'
3.

Lack of Sentence Flexibility

The drug violations under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401,
provide a mandatory sentence of four to fifteen years for a violation
under subsection (b),18 2 and a mandatory sentence of six to thirty
years for a violation under subsection (a) unless the amount of drugs
is great enough to fall into para. 1401.1, which would allow an

increased sentence from nine to sixty years.' 3 Because drug induced
homicide carries a mandatory fifteen to thirty year sentence, the only

difference between a drug induced homicide conviction and a drug
conviction under 1401 is a judge cannot sentence the offender to less

than fifteen years. The court merely loses the discretion of sentencing

the offender to the possible lows of four or six years for the drug
179. See Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974) [hereinafter
Schulhofer].
180. See Smith, Element of Chance in Criminal Liability, 1971 CPM. L. REV.
63.

181. Schulhofer, supra note 179, at 1511.
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(4) (1988) (Sentence for a Class 1
felony).
183. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(3) (1988) (Sentence for a Class X
felony). If the drug amounts are great enough to fall into ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2,
para. 1401.1 § 401.1 (1988), the mandatory punishments increase depending on the
amount of drugs, from the low of nine to 40 years, to 15 to 60 years, for a very
large amount of drugs.
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offenses. However, when a sentence above the minimum for the drug
offense is imposed, it could be the same as that of a drug induced
homicide conviction.18 4 The statute would serve as a better deterrent
to drug dealers if it imposed the mandatory fifteen years on all 1401
(a) and (b) violators, not just the 1401 violators unlucky enough to
have a user die on them.
4.

Severity of Sentence Compared to Common Law Crime in This
Context
Under the common law cases in the absence of legislation, the
most unanimity can be found in the imposition of manslaughter in
this context. Since manslaughter is generally a killing done without
the intent to kill, this result made sense. When prosecutors attempted
to prosecute drug suppliers with first degree depraved-heart murder,
most courts balked. When prosecutors sought application of the
felony-murder doctrine, some courts rejected the approach while
others allowed it. The most common and universal result, however,
is manslaughter. States like Arizona, Connecticut and Florida are
being far too harsh in imposing the death penalty for what was at
common law merely manslaughter. The low culpability needed for
this crime, the lack of a mental state for the killing, lend support for
imposing a form of homicide in this context less than first degree
murder or capital murder.
The Illinois statute allows the state to impose a murder type of
liability to everyone in the drug chain of delivery to the deceased user.
This potential result ignores the reality of drug usage: drugs are
shared, split, passed from user to user and often given away among
users. Many users may technically be in the drug chain of delivery as
drugs are passed from user to user who would not be considered drug
dealers under any logical meaning of the term. Thus, many of the
new drug induced homicide offenses punish far too severely, given
the broad sweep of the offense.
5.

Lack of Recognition of User's Culpabilityfor His/Her Own
Death
Drug users, just like drug dealers, also know that drugs kill. The
drug user must accept some responsiblity for his own death. Unlike
184. In fact, the legislature could have included "death of a user" under ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2 (1988), factors in aggravation, and accomplished
the same result as it did with the drug induced homicide statute. This is how the
United States Code was written to punish drug felons whose sales cause death or
serious bodily injury. The death or serious bodily injury is a factor which elevates
the sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1982) (penalties).
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Illinois' felony-murder rule, which requires an "innocent person" die
as a result of the felony, the drug user is no "innocent." He or she
is taking a drug knowing it can kill. In the case of injected drugs,
users also know a shared needle can also carry a slow killer, AIDS.
It seems obvious a drug user would probably have "assumed the
risk" if his estate were to sue the drug dealer in a wrongful death
tort action. Why should the drug user not take some of the responsibility for the death which results from his own drug use? Certainly,
the user has the most at stake when he or she takes potentially lethal
drugs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of legislation, a handful of states struggled to
impose homicide liability on drug suppliers for the deaths of their
customers. When zealous prosecutors attempted to stretch first degree
murder to fit the drug context, they were successful only about half
the time, under either the depraved heart or the felony-murder approaches. When prosecutors charged drug suppliers with manslaughter, they were successful in almost every case reported. A successful
depraved-heart murder prosecution must prove that furnishing drugs
is so dangerous that the supplier demonstrates a "don't give a damn
attitude" with every delivery. Some courts reject this finding, stating
that it is far more likely a drug user lives than dies from each and
every purchase. However, as cocaine and heroin purity has increased
in the last ten years, so have deaths.'85 In the drug context, courts are
split over imposing felony-murder without a statute on point. Once
the legislature passes a drug induced homicide statute or drug felonymurder statute, however, it is unclear how the common law felonymurder limitations will be imposed on this new form of homicide.
States creating this offense should clearly indicate a mental state
even if the mental state is to be satisfied by an underlying drug
offense. The mental state should indicate the person charged be a for
profit drug dealer, supplier or deliverer. The reality of drug use is
such that many drug users may have possession of an amount of
drugs that eventually kills another. The statute should not impose the
highest form of homicide, capital murder or first degree murder, but
should impose a homicide liability similar to the lesser forms of
murder. The statute should clearly indicate whose death triggers the
imposition of drug induced homicide. The death which invokes drug
induced homicide should be that of the user.
185. See supra notes 1-3.
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The Illinois statute is overbroad. The General Assembly should
consider amending the statute by specifying a mental state, requiring
consideration for the delivery of drugs that subsequently kill and
make clear the intent to impose homicide liability upon the death of
a user. If the legislature intended a broader meaning, it should make
that intent clear. Illinois courts will be forced to deal with some of
the statute's problems through interpretation. Illinois courts should
require consideration in the drug induced homicide context as part of
the common law requirement that felonies underlying the felonymurder rule be dangerous. Or the courts could require a showing that
the defendant is a drug dealer based on the profit the defendant
made. A very large quantity or any kind of profit indicate the more
culpable behavior of a drug dealer, who is the target of this statute.
THOMAS

N.

OSRAN

